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This paper describes an ongoing project on the causality assessment of adverse drug reactions. 
My collaborators in this project are physicians who are experts in various aspects of adverse reactions: 
Dre. Tom Hutchinson and Michael Kramer (clinical epidemiologists at McGill University), Claudio 
Naranjo (Department of Pharmacology, University of Toronto), and Judith Jones (Department of 
Medicine, Georgetown University). The project is supported by grants from the Drug Information 
Association, the American Medical Association's Education and Research Foundation, and several 
pharmaceutical companies. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 describes the problem of causality assessment. 
Section 2 outlines the approach my group is taking to solve the problem, based on coherent probability 
assessment. Section 3 raises and answers an important criticism of our approach, and Section 4 
illustrates why it is important to supplement clinical judgement with probabilistic reasoning. 
1. INTRODUCTION: CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT FOR 
ADVERSE DRUG REACTIONS 
The problem of causality assessment concerns the following question: a patient is administered a 
drug and subsequently experiences an adverse clinical event; did the drug cause the event to happen? 
A number of important decisions depend in part on the answer to this question. For example: 
• Should a clinician discontinue the use of a drug that is effective for his patient, but may be 
causing an adverse reaction? 
• How should a pharmaceutical company react to the fact that two patients in a clinical trial of a 
new anti-ulcer drug developed liver disease? 
• Should the editor of a medical journal publish a case report of a suspected new adverse drug 
reaction - and, if so, what standards of documentation should be required? 
· • How should an epidemiologist studying the incidence of in-hospital iatrogenic disease decide 
whether a particular case of renal failure is drug-induced? 
In addition, many pharmaceutical companies and national regulatory agencies engaged in postmar-
keting surveillance routinely assess causality for case reports of suspected adverse reactions submitted 
to them by clinicians (these are called "spontaneous reports"). And of course, causality assessment 
has obvious implications in liability law. 
1 
Several factors make causality assessment a difficult medical problem (see, for example, Irey 
(1976) and Kramer (1981)). In particular, almost all drug-associated adverse events have alternative 
drug and nondrug etiologies, often including the disease that the drug is being used to treat, and there 
are rarely tests that conclusively differentiate between these etiological candidates. Polypharmacy 
poses another difficulty: many patients receive more than one drug during the same time period, 
so that even if it seems clear that an adverse event is drug-induced, the problem of which drug is 
responsible must still be resolved. 
Here is an example of a case, paraphrased from a spontaneous report received by the manufacturer 
of one of the drugs (this case is discussed in Kramer (1986)): 
CASE SUMMARY 
A 42-year old woman was found dead in her home after a mid-day visit to the dentist. The 
reconstructed history from friends indicated that she was probably in good health but had been 
taking propranolol for high blood pressure. The dentist related that she had given a history of a 
heart murmur on her previous visit and that he had instructed her to take two penicillin V tablets 
one hour prior to her appointment for extraction of a wisdom tooth. She related no history of drug 
allergy. Prior to the oral surgery, she had an injection (infiltration of the area) with xylocaine. The 
extraction procedure lasted 40 minutes. She was instructed to go home and rest and was given 
a prescription for 5 zomepirac tablets, 100 mg every 4 to 6 hours for pain (p.r.n.). She was also 
instructed to continue the penicillin for one day. 
The woman's death was discovered that evening when dinner guests arrived. Prescriptions for 
zomepirac, penicillin V, and propranolol were found in her home. Autopsy revealed pulmonary 
congestion and some hyperinflation, along with evidence of laryngeal edema and swelling of the 
extremities. An analysis of the stomach contents revealed no drugs associated with abuse, such as 
narcotics, amphetamines, or barbituates. The coroner estimated the time of death as 4:00 P.M., plus 
or minus 2 hours. 
Notice that four drugs are mentioned in this report; at least three of them can cause sudden 
death from anaphylactic shock, and the fourth, propranol, is believed to increase the chance that 
other drugs will produce immunologic reactions. Also, note how much the report does not say: for 
example, did the patient actually take zomepirac or penicillin ( and did she just take penicillin before 
the procedure, or did she also take one after the procedure as recommended?) We do not know, nor 
do we know exactly when she died. 
The usual approach to a causality assessment problem is to refer it to an expert, who solves it 
by an act of global introspection: that is, the expert collects all the facts that he thinks are relevant 
to the problem at hand, mixes them together in his head - and then he just decides what his answer 
is. Because of the complexity and uncertainty inherent in these problems, global introspection does 
not work well. About ten years ago, several groups of clinical pharmacologists - including Karch 
et al. (1976) and Koch-Weser et al. (1977) - showed how unreliable expert global introspection 
is, by comparing their evaluations of a series of suspected adverse drug reactions and documenting 
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the extent of their disagreement. In addition, global introspection is uncalibrated: it is usual for 
experts to express their judgements in terms of a qualitative probability scale (that is: "doubtful", 
"possible~, "probable", and "definite"), but your "possible" might be equivalent to my "probable". 
Other shortcomings of global introspection are discussed in Lane (1984). 
Because of these difficulties with global introspection, during the past decade there has been 
much effort devoted to developing decision aids for this problem. There are now more than a dozen 
published algorithms or standardized assessment schemes for the causal analysis of adverse drug 
reactions, ranging from simple flow charts posing ten or fewer questions to len.gthy questionnaires 
containing up to 84 items. These schemes have been constructed by physicians from industry, regu-
latory agencies and academia. 
While the schemes differ in many particulars, they share a common basic structure. They divide 
the considerations that bear on causality assessment into a number of factors or axes: for example, the 
timing of the adverse event in relation to administration of the drug; alternative etiological candidates; 
previous recognition of the event as a _possible adverse reaction to the drug; the response when the 
drug is discontinued ( dechallenge) and when subsequently the drug is readministered ( rechallenge). 
Information relevant to each factor is elicited by a series of questions, the answers to which are 
restricted to yes/no/(and occasionally) don't know. The answers to these questions are then converted 
to a score for each factor; the factor scores are summed; and this overall score is converted into a 
value on a qualitative probability scale. 
These schemes are not free from criticism. Some experts in adverse reactions c~mplain that the 
schemes, with their preset series of questions, are too inflexible (in the words of Dukes (1984), the 
schemes eliminate consideration of those "entirely unexpected but vital imponderables which play a 
role in determining the value of a particular piece of evidence"). In particular, the schemes cannot 
handle uncertainty about the details of a case, like whether or not the woman in the example quoted 
above actually took zomepirac and penicillin. Moreover, even adherents of the schemes· agree that 
their procedures for converting answers into factor scores and factor scores to qualitative probability 
ratings are arbitrary. 
A further defect of the schemes, evident to anyone who thinks about epistemic probability, is that 
they are incoherent. In particular, in the presence of the kind of "hard" frequency information that 
everyone could agree would justify a quantitatlve treatment of causality assessment, the schemes do 
not perform in accordance with the rules of probability. For example, suppose that when a particular 
analgesic is taken to relieve the pain associated with flu, 1 in 8 patients become nauseous; while 1 in 10 
untreated flu patients suffer from nausea. On the other hand, drug-induced nausea is overwhelmingly 
likely to occur within one hour of administration of the drug, while nausea caused by the flu can 
occur at any time within the first two days following the onset of the flu. If in a particular case, the 
patient becomes nauseous 45 minutes after taking the analgesic, the odds in favor of drug causation 
is 12, corresponding to a probability of 0.92. Yet when this artificial case is run through current 
standardized schemes, the resulting causality ratings range from "doubtful" to "possible"! 
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There are three reasons for these too conse"ative assessments. First, the schemes do not allow 
sharp information about a single factor (in this case, timing) to override neutral or weakly negative 
data rel~ting to other factors (for example, the absence of dechallenge and rechallenge information 
or the existence of an altemative etiologic candidate). Second, the schemes treat the emtence 
of altemative etiologies as a separate factor and just examine the data about other factors for their 
consistency with the hypothesis of drug causation, rather than comparing how consistent the observed 
data are with each altemative etiology. Third, the schemes do not process quantitative information 
directly, so that the strength of the timing information in the example cannot be adequately assessed, 
nor can the information about incidences and timing be directly combined. For a detailed discussion 
of the problems with existing causality assessment methods, see Hutchinson and Lane (1986). 
2. A BAYESIAN APPROACH TO CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT 
Motivated by dissatisfaction with existing methods, my collaborators - all of whom had previously 
constructed published standardized schemes - and I decided to join forces to create a coherent, 
quantitative approach to the problem. Our project has two versions of its goal. The weak version 
is to develop a causality assessment method that does better than existing methods, and we have, 
I believe, already achieved that (see Hutchinson and Lane (1986) for a discussion of what_ it means 
to "do better"). The strong version is harder. It is to develop methods that medically-trained 
assessors can use and that satisfy Fisher's fundamental dictum: never throw information away. That 
is, the methods should allow assessors to incorporate information about all the factors they regard 
as relevant in a particular case, from all the sources available to them. We have a good deal of work 
ahead of us before this version of our goal is achieved. 
In the remainder of this section, I will summarize the ideas underlying our approach to causality 
assessment. See Lane et al. (1986) for details of the approach and Jones and Herman (1986) for 
examples of its use. 
As we have formulated the problem, the goal of causality assessment is to calculate the posterior 
odds in favor of drug ca.usa.tion: 
P(D-+ EI B,C) + P(D-f+ EI B,C). (1) 
Here, D is a drug and E is an adverse event suffered by a particular patient. The proposition "D -+ E" 
( D caused E) is taken to mean that E would not have happened as and when it did, had D not been 
administered to the patient; the proposition "D -f+ Ii? denies "D -+ E". B represents 6a.ckground 
information, including everything the assessor can bring to bear to analyze any case involving a 
connection between the drug D and events similar to E (for example: his clinical experience, the 
results of epidemiological studies, facts and theories from basic sciences such as pharmacology). The 
only case-specific information in B is the proposition that a patient with clinical condition M who 
has been administered drug D in a specified way subsequently develops an adverse event of type Et-
( M and Et are generic characterizations. There is a good deal of freedom in defining them for any 
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particular assessment - see Lane et al. (1986) for some guidelines. The critical consideration is 
that they be explicitly defined and remain fixed throughout the course of any particular assessment 
problem). C represents case in/ormation, all the details referring to the particular patient at hand 
and his adverse event E (of type Ee, of course). 
There are three aspects of the causality assessment problem, formulated by expression (1), that 
make it interesting from a statistical point of view. First, unlike some diagnostic problems in which 
additional confirming information will eventually result in a certain diagnosis, whether or not D 
caused E in any particular case is inherently and permanently unobservable. Thus, standard statis-
tical fitting techniques for estimating the value of a probability cannot be applied to the causality 
assessment probability P{ D -+ E I B, C), since there are no data on the value of the response for 
cases constituting a training sample. Second, there is very little "hard" data on adverse reactions, like 
frequencies obtained from clinical trials, since serious adverse events are quite rare, with incidences 
in the range 1/1000 to 1/100,000 and beyond. Third, there is an abundance of potentially useful 
"soft" data: clinical lore and experience, the information contained in spontaneous case reports, and 
facts and theories from the basic sciences. The challenge is to access and quantify this "soft" data, 
in such a way that it can be combined with whatever "hard" data is available to assess the posterior 
odds given in (1) above. 
Directly assessing the posterior odds itself is possible, but very unreliable, since this is just 
"global introspection" made quantitative. The strategy we employ to evaluate the posterior odds is 
coherent decomposition. That is, we use the coherent linkages of probability theory ( especially Bayes' 
Theorem and the Law of Total Probability) to decompose the posterior odds into components that 
are sufficiently "local" that they are directly accessible to the assessor's knowledge and experience 
and are predictive. 
A probability ass~ssment problem is predictive if the proposition that is the subject of the as-
sessment can be interpreted in terms of future observables. If a suitable exchangeable reference 
population can be obtained, then predictive probabilities can be interpreted in terms of frequencies 
of future observations in the reference population, and so the methods that are used to obtain these 
probabilities can be subjected to predictive validation tests. 
It is more difficult to know whether a probability assessment problem is in fact accessible. Acces-
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sibility is highly subject-matter dependent, although I am sure that there are some meta-principles 
that might characterize accessibility across fields. At this stage in our work, we are only trying 
to discover what assessment tasks are accessible to experts in adverse drug reactions. We use two 
empirical checks to help determine when we have an assessment problem that is accessible. First, do 
experts "feel comfortable" making the required assessment, or do they complain that they cannot 
quantitate their uncertainty about the proposition in question - they just "don't know"? Second, 
when they carry out the assessment, do the experts agree with one another? If the propositions 
are sufficiently accessible to the experts' experiences and those experiences adequately mirror what 
actually happens in the world, then it is reasonable to expect a fair amount of agreement. And, much 
to our surprise, we are finding that we can obtain it among the experts with whom we work. (We 
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are planning some experiments to document this phenomenon of "converge by localization" in the 
relatively near future). I believe that the ability to determine which probability assessment problems 
are accessible is the key to the successful application of subjective Bayesian methods in areas that 
share with causality assessment a preponderance of "soft" to "hard" data. 
The first step in our decomposition of the posterior odds is designed to increase accessibility. 
Assessors find it difficult working through causality assessment problems that, like the case presented 
above, involve more than one drug etiological candidate at a time. We deal with this problem by 
the "one-drug-at-a-time" strategy, which works as follows. Suppose there are n possible drug causes, 
D1 , ••• ,Dn. Let A. be the proposition that if there is a drug cause of E, then that cause is Di, 
and let PO(D. I A.) be the posterior odds in favor of D., given A._. That is, PO(D. I A.) is the 
appropriate posterior odds for a problem identical in every respect to the original problem, except 
that only a single possible drug cause, D., is entertained by the assessor. Then by Bayes' Theorem, 
PO(D.) = PO(D. I .4.) + (1 + E;¢.PO(D; I A;)). (2) 
By separately computing PO(D, I A.) for each drug candidate D. in a given problem and then 
using equation (2) to solve the original problem, assessors need only consider problems that have 
only one drug etiological candidate, which I shall henceforth refer to as D. 
The second step in the decomposition illustrates how probabilities about unobservable proposi-
tions can be coherently linked to probabilities that are (at least in principle) predictive. By Bayes' 
Theorem, 
P(D _. EI B,C) = P(D _. Et I B) X P(C I D 4 E, B) 
P(D -f+ EI B,C) P(D -f+ Et I B) P(C I D -f+ E, B) 
posterior odds prior odds likelihood ratio (3) 
Note the difference between the posterior and prior odds terms. Since both are evaluated condi-
tionally on B, they both refer to a patient with clinical condition M who has been administered D 
and experienced an event of type Et. But the identity of the patient differs: in the posterior odds, 
it is the particular patient for whom the causality assessment is being carried out, while in the prior 
odds, it is a "g~neric" patient (for example, the "next" patient) with the three defining properties 
M, D, and E,. Hence the substitution of the symbol Et for E in the prior odds. 
To see how equation (3) can convert assessment problems involving unobservable propositions 
to problems in which all the probabilities generate predictions, consider the following special case. 
Imagine that records are available for a large group of patients with M, and that the subgroup 
of patients who receive D is otherwise prognostically equivalent to the subgroup who do not, with 
respect to their chances for suffering an event of type Et. In this case, it is easy to see that 
P(D _. Et I B) - P(Et I D) - P(Et I DC) 
P(D -f+ Et I B) - P(Et I De) (4) 
where P( Et I D) is the probability of an event of type E, among the patients who receive D, and 
P(Et I De) is the probability of such an event among the patients who do not receive D. Both 
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P(Et I D) and P(Et I D 0 ) are then predictive probabilities, and hence in this case the prior odds, 
without further decomposition, is a function of probabilities subject to predictive validation. 
The probabilities that appear in the likelihood ratio term in (3) are not predictive, since they are 
conditioned on an unobservable cause. On the other hand, they can be mixed with respect to the 
incidence probabilities that appear in the right-hand side of ( 4), to yield P( C I B), which generates 
predictions that can be verified in the class of future patients with M who experience an event of 
type Et after taking drug D. 
The third step in the decomposition of the posterior odds involves decomposing the likelihood ra-
tio term in (3) into a series of factors determined by chronology. Figure 1 indicates the chronological 
categories of case information for a typical case: Hi (patient's history antedating the onset of E), Ti 
(the timing of the onset of E in relation to the administration of D), Ch (the characteristics of the 
event from time of onset to time of dechallenge), De (response to dechallenge), and Re (response to 
rechallenge). There are, of course, other ways to structure case information than chronologically, but 
assessors find working through the case sequentially in time easier than other patternings we have 
tried. In addition, the data in the various chronological categories are often mutually independent, 
given the etiology of the event, which simplifies the assessments of the likelihood ratio factors. Fig-
ure 2 presents some questions that elicit relevant case information in each of the five chronological 
categories. 
In summary, the posterior odds is decomposed into six factors: the prior odds and five likelihood 
ratio factors. In turn, each of these must be subjected to secondary decompositions that depend on 
the kind of information that is available. For example, to evaluate the likelihood ratio for timing in 
the sudden death case, the distributions for the following quantities had to be assessed: actual time 
of death, given the interval provided by the coroner; the time the drugs were taken (including, for 
zomepirac and the two doses of penicillin, the probability they were taken at all); and, for each drug 
D, given D causes sudden death, the time from administration of D until death. 
At this point in our work, we carry out these assessment tasks as a group activity. First, each 
expert in the group separately assesses the distribution under consideration. When the experts 
disagree with one another, we do not try to merge their probability assessments to achieve some sort 
of group distribution. Rather, we try to determine the informational ( and conjectural) background 
that underlie the differences. Typically, we can identify the sources of disagreement in terms of 
data or possible mechanisms taken into account by some but not all of the experts. We then try 
to resolve the disagreements by formally incorporating the new pooled informational background by 
conditioning, expanding out the original probability assessment problem through the Law of Total 
Probabilities. In this way, we learn what kinds of considerations turn out to be relevant to each of 
the assessment tasks we face, and we come closer to canonical, accessible decompositions for each of 
these tasks. 
We are now in the process of constructing models for each of these assessment tasks to replace the 
rather arduous ad hoc subjective assessment process I have described above. For example, T, the time 
to onset of a dose-dependent adverse reaction, can be modeled as the sum of three random variables 
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that are typically independent of one another: T1, the time to toxic accumulation of the relevant 
drug m.etabolite at the target organ (whose distribution depends on pharmacologic properties of D 
and on the target organ); T2, the time from T1 to clinical detectability (whose distribution depends 
on E,); and Ta, the time from T2 to detection (whose distribution depends on E, and characteristics 
of the patient). We can model each of these in such a way that the relevant distribution for T can 
be derived in response to the answers that the assessor gives to a few factual questions, so that, if 
the conditions for the validity of this model are satisfied in a particular case, the assessor need do 
no direct probability appraisal to determine the numerator of the likelihood ratio for timing. The 
advantages of such models are clear: they give more reproducible assessments in an efficient way; 
they are relatively automatic and so can be implemented for interactive computing; and, because 
they can be used in many different situations, they can generate a lot of predictions to validate. 
The prior odds term poses the most difficult assessment problem, because there is little in the 
experience of any individual clinician that helps him estimate the magnitudes of the incidence prob-
abilities of equation ( 4). On the other hand, techniques for assessing these incidence probabilities 
( and hence the prior odds) are particularly important even outside the causality assessment context, 
since these probabilities play a key role in risk-benefit analyses designed to answer the question: 
should drug D be used in a particular clinical situation or not? There are three primary sources of 
quantitative information relevant to assessing the prior odds: 
1) Direct Frequencies: Some large databases record data about exposures to drugs and subsequent 
experience with adverse events for particular classes of patients, drugs and events (see, for example, 
Jones et al. (1984) and Wilholm and Westerholm (1984)). Generally, a great deal of care must be 
taken when interpreting the information in these databases, particularly with regard to diagnostic 
classification. In addition, these databases typically provide no case details about the events they 
record. 
2) Indirect Frequencies: Spontaneous report registries maintained by pharmaceutical companies, 
national monitoring and regulatory agencies and the medical literature contain records of suspected 
adverse reactions. To use the information in these registries, models need to be constructed to 
account for the fraction of all events that get into the registries, which presumably depends on such 
factors as the time on the market of the drug D, the seriousness of the event type E,. and so forth. 
In addition, so-called "denominator" data documenting number of exposures to the drug need to be 
obtained elsewhere ( this can be done for many drugs fairly accurately). 
3) Related Frequencies: Many drugs are chemically or pharmacologically related to other drugs, 
for which the incidence of adverse reactions may be better known. It should be possible to use 
information about related drugs to generate predictive distributions for new drugs about which less 
is known, and we are beginning to work on this problem. 
Our aim is to develop models to estimate the incidence probabilities of equation ( 4) that directly 
assimilate the three kinds of data described above. We have made some progress in this direction; 
what we do now in practice is to use "plug-in" estimates based on subjective assessments of the 
terms that will eventually be modeled. For example, to assess P(Et I zomepirac) in the sudden 
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death case, we used an indirect frequency argument, based on the number of reports that the F .D.A. 
had received at the time this case occurred, an estimate of number of exposures based on data from 
I.M.S., America, (Ambler, PA), and an estimate ofrepo~ing frequency based on the experience of one 
of our group (Dr. J. Jones), who had previously served as head of the F.D.A.'s spontaneous report 
system. We also typically now use a "concurrent validation" approach to estimating the prior odds, 
by generating separate estimates from different information sources, which we pool with subjective 
weights if they do not differ substantially and attempt to gather further information and probe for 
sources of the discrepancy if they are widely disparate. 
At this stage in our work, our causality assessments are fairly complicated. For example, the 
sudden death case required the subj8(?tive assessment of about 30 probability distributions. The 
conclusion that followed from all these assessments was that the woman's death was nearly certainly 
caused by a drug, with the leading two drug candidates zomepirac (posterior probability of causation 
= 0.92) and the dose of penicillin taken before the dental surgery (posterior probability 0.04). This 
conclusion was quite robust under reasonable perturbations of the assessed values for the component 
probabilities (see Kramer (1986)). 
3. A CRITICISM AND ITS ·REBUTTAL 
To some, the kind of analysis describe above may seem like quantification run amuck. Thirty 
subjective probability assessments, each necessarily carried out with at least a little imprecision, may 
seem a lot more likely to produce mere ramified imprecision than truth. 
There are several answers to this criticism: 
1) The Role of Decision: The purpose of causality assessments should be to guide decisions. 
Frequently, when there are a limited number of available actions, like whether to continue or stop 
administering a drug suspected of causing an adverse reaction, the exact value of a probability is 
not the issue. The key question is whether or not the probability exceeds a certain threshhold value 
at which the optimal action changes. If, when the values obtained for the component probability 
assessments are subjected to reasonable sensitivity perturbations, the probability of D-causation stays 
on the same side of the threshhold, then the issue of imprecision is irrelevant. When it does not, it 
may be possible to identify the assessments whose imprecision is responsible for the change and to 
develop a coherent decomposition to convert these problems into ones that are more accessible and 
whose assessments are correspondingly more precise. 
In addition, if decisions really hinge on the outcome of a causality assessment, what is the 
alternative to the approach described here? Uncertainty is a fact of life; good decision-making 
requires that uncertainty be measured, not ignored. And surely it is easier and more meaningful to 
measure uncertainty about propositions that are accessible to the assessor's knowledge and experience 
than to propositions that are not. 
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2) The Eztent of Imprecision: The more successful a coherent decomposition is in producing a 
set of assessment problems that are accessible and predictive, the less imprecision there should be in 
the component probabilities and, I conjecture, in the overall probability. This is a testable conjecture, 
and testing it will provide one focus of my group's research activity in the next year. 
3) Compensating Advantages: The probabilistic approach to causality assessment has some 
advantages over other approaches that directly compensate and help alleviate the disadvantage of 
quantitative imprecision. In particular, the approach is e:,;plicit (that is, it puts out in the open all 
the information and the assumptions that an assessment is based upon); it is transparent (that is, it 
reveals how each element in the overall assessment fits together); and it is logical (since it synthesizes 
the evidence coherently). As a consequence of these properties, the approach focuses disagreement 
either on the assessor's structuring of the problem ( that is, whether he took into account all possible 
causes and sources of evidence) or on the local level of the component assessments, where resolution 
is most easily achieved. 
4. PROBABILITY AND CLINICAL JUDGEMENT 
Another possible approach to the causality assessment problem would be to try to construct 
a rule-based expert system, similar to other diagnostic expert systems like Mycin (Shortliffe and 
Buchanan (1984)). Such systems start with the assumption that the goal is to capture the "knowledge 
base" that experts use when they carry out the task that the expert system is designed to perform. 
In the rules that comprise this "knowledge base", information about the factors that can affect 
the diagnosis and opinions about the evidentiary significance of this information are inextricably 
intertwined. One of the main conclusions that has come out of our experience with the probabilistic 
analysis of causality assessment is that the experts' opinions about evidentiary signific~ce are not 
necessarily trustworthy, and that to model the way experts weigh and integrate evide~ce may give 
better insight into psychology than into adverse drug reactions. I contend that the rules of coherence 
provide a better structure for inference than the experts' heuristic rules. I will offer in support of 
this contention some examples comparing our results to expert global introspection and standardized 
assessment schemes (which can be thought of as primitive expert systems). 
Consider the question of whether or not the woman who died suddenly in the example case 
actually took zomepirac. Some physicians who reviewed this case at a recent conference on causality 
assessment reasoned as follows: since we think it is at best only "possible" that the woman took 
zomepirac, we cannot consider the drug more than a "possible" cause of her death, in contrast to 
the conclusion reached by probabilistic analysis in Kramer (1986). The fallacy in this argument is 
easy to find probabilistically, but apparently not so obvious through standard clinical reasoning; it 
mistakes a prior for a posterior probability. (Many patients do not take an analgesic after dental 
surgery; but most patients do not die suddenly! As Sherlock Holmes used to say, once you have 
eliminated the obvious, only the unlikely remains.) In fact, the analysis in Kramer (1986) assigned 
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probability 0.8 to the event that a patient would take a prescribed analgesic for pain after extraction 
of a wisdom tooth; even a much lower assignment would not have changed the overwhelmingly high 
posterior probability that this woman took zomepirac_ (and died as a result). 
A more general example of inadequate heuristic reasoning concerns the role of the prior odds. 
Psychologists have shown how people seem to ignore background incidences when reasoning under 
uncertainty (see Kahneman et al. (1982)), and the extent to which this is true in the causality assess-
ment context is evident from a perusal of all the standardized assessment schemes. Yet frequently 
our probabilistic analyses find the prior odds as the driving factor in determining drug causation 
in particular cases. An interesting example concems some work that one of my collaborators (Dr. 
C. Naranjo) has been carrying out with respect to the connection ~etween the anti-depressant drug 
zimelidine and Guillain-Barre syndrome (GBS). GBS can develop as a sequela to a viral infection, 
which manifests itself as general malaise, perhaps accompanied by nausea and vomiting. On the other 
hand, these are also the first symptoms of G BS, regardless of cause. Thus, as long as zimelidine is 
withdrawn quickly after onset of the syndrome, the likelihood ratio terms for any case of GBS will 
favor the viral cause over drug cause (since the onset of GBS follows predictably and rapidly after the 
flu-like symptoms and the characteristics of the syndrome do not seem to depend on the cause). So 
all the evidence favoring drug causation is in the prior odds, which for this problem can be estimated 
very precisely and are overwhelmingly in favor of zimelidine as the cause in each of the cases in the 
series under analysis. It is hard to see how this result could be reproduced in the expert systems 
context. 
Again, a reading of any of the standardized assessment schemes will show that experts in ad-
verse drug reactions seem to believe that positive responses to dechallenge and especially rechallenge 
provide strong and even conclusive evidence of drug causation. We have encountered examples in 
our assessments in which these beliefs turn out to be false; it is· possible for a seemingly "positive" 
response to dechallenge to tell against drug causation and for a positive response to rechallenge to be 
essentially neutral. These examples involve delicate quantitative comparisons, and although it might 
be possible to construct rules that cover each case in which we have so far found exceptions to the 
prevailing heuristics, I am not confident that an expert who did not think probabilistically would be 
likely to do so. 
As a final example, we find that our probabilistic assessments tend to be much more definite (one 
way or the other) than are the results obtained by global introspection and (particularly) standardized 
assessment schemes. I believe that the explanation for this phenomenon is that the heuristic rules 
for weighing and combining evidence that drive these altemative methods are incapable of extracting 
the full measure of evidence from incomplete data and uncertain beliefs. That is the job of subjective 
probability assessment. 
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Eliciting Case Information 
The assessor should answer each of the following questions. If he is unsure of the correct answer, 
he should state the grounds and extent of his uncertainty (in probabilistic terms). While the answers 
to these questions will provide all of the relevant case information for many cases, any additional 
case information that can help differentiate between drug and nondrug etiological candidates in a 
particular case under review should also be noted in the appropriate chronological period. 
1. Hi: 
a. Has the patient taken Dor similar drugs before? How frequently? On how many of these 
occasions did he experience an event of type Et or another possible adverse reaction? Describe, 
if different from Et. 
b. How frequently has the patient previously experienced events of type Et without exposure to 
Dor related drugs? 
c. Are there any attributes of the patient that place him at special risk to event of type Et from 
any cause? If so, what are they, and from which cases is he at special risk? 
2. Ti: When in relation to the course of D-therapy did the patient experience the event E? H 
available, give the time-course of all prodromal events. 
3. Ch: 
a. Are there any data about levels of D in tissues or body fluids during the time the patient 
experienced E? If so, what are they? 
b. Are there any distinctive details in clinical presentation, laboratory results, pathological find-
ings, or duration that can help differentially diagnose the cause of E? If so, what are they? 
c. Did the symptoms of E abate before dechallenge occurred? If so, how long after the time of 
onset of E? 
4. De: 
a. Was D discontinued or its dosage reduced after the onset of E? If so, describe how and when. 
b. If dechallenge occurred, did the manifestations of E abate? If so, to what extent and when? 
c. Were the manifestations of E treated directly? Was a specific antagonist to D administered? 
What was the result? 
5. Re: 
a. If dechallenge occurred, was the patient subsequently rechallenged with D? If so, when and 
in what dosage? 
b. If rechallenge occurred, did the manifestations of E recur? If so, to what extent and when? 
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